Her er lidt blogs og artikler om, hvordan Obamas kampagne var selv-organiseret på græsrodsplan.

The New Organizers, Part 1: What's really behind Obama's ground game

It was a huge risk for the national field program to have paid staff take the time to methodically build volunteer teams instead of rushing directly to spend all their time running voter contact activities themselves. From the point of view of the conventional wisdom of much of the pre-Obama field organizing world, the campaign is actually taking two big risks: first they are risking everything on the effectiveness of masses of volunteers, then they are risking everything again by relying on volunteer teams to lead those masses. What if teams was just a bunch of hippy nonsense? What if it turned out there just weren't that many unpaid activists capable of running high-quality canvasses?

Jeremy Bird, the Ohio general election director and one of the driving forces behind making teams a national strategy, said, "We decided in terms of timeline that [our organizers] would not be measured by the amount of voter contacts they made in the summer—but instead by the number of volunteers that they were recruiting, training and testing. It was much more an infrastructure focus. So there would be no calls from Chicago saying, 'Why haven't you made more calls?!' Instead there would be calls saying, 'Where are your neighborhood team volunteers?' Or, if the numbers seemed high, 'Are they real?' It was a whole shift in mentality that was really, really good."

We saw glimpses of the potential for this kind of organizing campaign in MoveOn's 2004 and 2006 volunteer operations, the Dean Campaign and even the Bush and Kerry campaigns. And there are great examples of this kind of organizing if you go back to the social movements of several decades ago. But the Obama campaign is the first in the Internet era to realize the dream of a disciplined, volunteer-driven, bottom-up-AND-top-down, distributed and massively scaleable organizing campaign. For anyone who knows how many times this has failed to happen, this is practically an apocryphal event. Marashal Ganz, who is an advisor to the national field campaign, and one of the main architects of the team model, said he's been waiting 40 years for it.

Obama basic training

She urged volunteers to hone their own stories of how they came to Obama – something they could compress into 30 seconds on the phone.
"Work on that, refine that, say it in the mirror," she said. "Get it down."
She told the volunteers that potential voters would no doubt confront them with policy questions. Mack's direction: Don't go there. Refer them to Obama's Web site, which includes enough material to sate any wonk.
The idea behind the personal narratives is to reclaim "values" politics from the Republican Party, said Marshall Ganz, a one-time labor organizer for Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers who developed "Camp Obama" training sessions for volunteers.
When people tell their stories of how they made choices and what motivates them, they communicate their values, Ganz said in an interview.

Marshall Ganz (professor, som teoretisk har lavet Obamas organisering af kampagnen)

Welcome to Marshall Ganz’s Web module on organizing. Professor Ganz is a long-time organizer; a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University; and a principal of Harvard’s Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations.

Obama's Secret Weapons: Internet, Databases and Psychology

In 2003, the Sierra Club realized that its local grassroots volunteer programs weren't effective. In late 2005, it commissioned the Harvard scholars to undertake a two-year research project to figure out why, and how to fix it. The researchers discovered that the kind of volunteers that the Sierra Club attracted were "lone ranger" types who focused on accomplishing goals on their own, rather than effectively working with others with "shared purpose."
The danger of this approach, Ganz says, is that individuals burn out easily. They try to do everything themselves rather than breaking the goals out into specific tasks that members of interdependent teams can accomplish in pieces. That's why relationships are so important, they found.  Ganz and Wageman's model gets members of teams to find out more about one another's experiences, and draw on each member's expertise.  The model also uses personal storytelling during workshops as a way to motivate peers and potential recruits to action.   

"Ultimately, your story should move people to specific action by painting a detailed picture of how things might be different if we act, giving us hope that if we act now we can make real that different future," explains the training manual.  
The stories are an exercise in relationship building, says Ganz. 
"What we've been doing is trying to teach people to do what Obama does during his speeches — to tell their own stories to motivate others," he says. "You're building this sense of commitment to both the values and people, but you're structuring it purposefully to achieve goals like, 'In this district, we need 2,000 votes.'"
The Obama campaign first experimented with the Ganz-Wageman system during the primaries, trying it out in Iowa and South Carolina. It won in both states, while in New Hampshire, where it ran a more-traditional marketing campaign, Obama lost. The campaign began phasing in the system nationwide in June. More than 23,000 people have participated in at least eight or more hours of leadership training provided by Camp Obama, according to Ganz.